Abstract and Keywords

There are two main loci of contemporary debate about the nature of Madhyamaka ethics. The first investigates the general issue of whether the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (śūnyavāda) is consistent with a commitment to systematic ethical distinctions. The second queries whether the metaphysical analysis of no-self presented by Śāntideva in his Bodhicaryāvatāra entails the impartial benevolence of a bodhisattva. This chapter critically examines these debates and demonstrates the ways in which they are shaped by competing understandings of Madhyamaka conventional truth or reality (saṃvṛtisatya) and the forms of reasoning admissible for differentiating conventional truth from falsity and good from bad.

Keywords: Madhyamaka, emptiness, Śāntideva, conventional truth, ethics, compassion, prāsaṅgika, altruism, no-self

Introduction

Madhyamaka is one of two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, alongside Yogācāra.[1] It is best known for its philosophy of emptiness (*śūnyavāda*) as articulated by Nāgārjuna in his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and has an illustrious lineage of eminent exponents in India, Tibet, and China. While Mādhyamikas are primarily concerned with metaphysical and semantic issues, central figures also address ethical matters. Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (BCA), in particular, provides the most extensive treatment of ethics within the Madhyamaka tradition. So influential is this text that the current Dalai Lama represents it as the epitome of Buddhist ethical thought (Gyatso 2004, 2009).

There is a growing body of philosophical literature focused on critically examining how the Madhyamaka analysis of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) bears on the ethical claims and commitments that were held and asserted by historical Mādhyamikas. There are two main loci of contemporary debate. The first concerns the general issue of whether Madhyamaka emptiness is consistent with a commitment to systematic ethical distinctions. The second queries whether the metaphysical analysis of no-self (*anātman*) presented by Śāntideva in

BCA entails or provides good reasons for the compassion or altruism of a bodhisattva. This second issue was galvanized by Paul Williams (1998), who powerfully argued that these ontological considerations not only fail to provide a rational basis for altruism but that Śāntideva's argument for this claim, if followed to its logical conclusion, actually undermined the bodhisattva path. Given the importance placed on this text within the Buddhist tradition, Williams's argument has unsurprisingly provoked a growing body of literature aimed at rationally reconstructing a positive (p. 163) account of Śāntideva's views and, thereby, a positive account of the relationship between a Madhyamaka metaphysical analysis and the Mahāyāna bodhisattva ideal of acting out of great compassion for the suffering of all sentient beings.

While many aim to rationally reconstruct Madhyamaka ethics in positive terms, there is considerable disagreement about what this should be. This chapter will critically examine this literature and will demonstrate that much disagreement turns on competing interpretations of the doctrine of the two truths from the perspective of Madhyamaka: in particular, competing accounts of conventional truth or reality (*saṃvṛtisatya*) as well as the forms of reasoning admissible for differentiating conventional truth from falsity and conventional good from bad. To draw this out, this chapter will begin by providing a general introduction to Madhyamaka *śūnyavāda* and outlining a range of positions on the nature of conventional reality that have been advanced and disputed by historical Madhyamaka thinkers in India and Tibet. It will then use these different conceptions to navigate the above two loci of contemporary debate.

Preliminary Background

Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) is the foundational text of Madhyamaka (English translations and commentaries can be found in Garfield 1995, Westerhoff 2009, and Siderits and Katsura 2013). It seeks to establish that all things are empty (*śūnya*) of an essence or intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).

The notion of *svabhāva* is rooted in early Buddhist attempts to explain the Buddha's doctrine of no-self (*anātman*). Abhidharma literature (the earliest scholastic literature of Indian Buddhism) proposed a two-tier mereological ontology whereby conceptually constructed wholes (universals, genera, kinds, and types) were considered to be reducible to ontologically simple, impartite entities (called *dharma*s). The reducible level was designated 'conventional reality' (*saṃvṛtisat*) as entities at this level are considered to be constructed, in part, in dependence on social and linguistic conventions. The reduced level was designated 'ultimate reality' (*paramārthasat*) and was considered to have mind-independent reality. To the extent that persons are complexes that are analysable into more primitive (psycho-physical) elements, they are conventionally but not ultimately real. It is also now commonplace to attribute to Ābhidharmikas the semantic principle that truth is a matter of what exists (Tanaka 2014, Cowherds 2011). More specifically, a conventional truth is (a statement about) what conventionally exists and an ultimate truth is (a statement about) what ultimately exists, i.e. simple, impartite entities. Thus, while it may be

conventionally true that a person exists at a certain time and location, this (statement) is ultimately false.

For this metaphysical and semantic analysis to be plausible, some criterion is needed to differentiate the reducible and the reduced levels of analysis. According to Ābhidharmikas, the criterion of ultimate reality is possession of an essence or *svabhāva*. There is some controversy about precisely how this notion is to be understood. In (p. 164) particular, there is historical and contemporary dispute about whether Ābhidharmikas maintained that *svabhāva* secures the independent existence of an object (Robinson 1972, Hayes 1994, Westerhoff 2009, Siderits 2007, Tanaka 2014, Tillemans 2016). It would seem that, on Nāgārjuna's understanding, to say that an object has *svabhāva* is to say that it has an essential property which is intrinsic to the object and that accounts for its independent existence. This essential property thus secures the numerical identity of the object and accounts for a genuine plurality of ultimately real entities. This essential property is also thought to withstand analysis in the sense of neither being further reducible (it is the bedrock of analysis) nor dissolving into contradictions under analysis.

In MMK, Nāgārjuna provides a series of reductio (*prasaṅga*) arguments aimed at showing that this notion of *svabhāva* is inconsistent with another central Buddhist teaching, the doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). Nāgārjuna argues that it is not possible, on pain of contradiction, for an object to both possess *svabhāva* and causally depend on other things for its existence. Since everything that exists is dependently originated, it follows that everything must be empty of *svabhāva* (MMK 24.19). If possessing *svabhāva* is the criterion of ultimate reality, it also follows that nothing ultimately exists. Moreover, if ultimate truth is (grounded in or corresponds to or is about) ultimate reality, it then follows that there is no ultimate truth. These entailments raise difficult questions. Do they imply, for instance, that nothing exists at all? What would secure the truth of these claims given that they seem to be statements about ultimate reality and thus of ultimate truth? Moreover, does this not remove the semantic underpinnings for the truth of the Buddha's teachings? Nāgārjuna insists that the key to avoiding these problematic implications lies in a proper understanding of the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth (MMK 24.8).

How best to understand Nāgārjuna's views on these two truths is enormously controversial and has been the subject matter of considerable commentarial dispute in India and Tibet. At least one interpretive issue bears on contemporary debates about the nature of Madhyamaka ethics. The issue concerns whether Nāgārjuna's reasoning does or does not establish a positive thesis as the result of a valid argument. The view that it does, defended by Bhāvaviveka, has come to be known as 'Svātantrika Madhyamaka' and the view that it does not, defended by Candrakīrti, is known as 'Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka'. Later Tibetan Mādhyamika commentators bitterly divide over how this distinction is best understood (Dreyfus and McClintock 2003). While some consider it to be insubstantial, reflecting a mere difference in rhetorical style (e.g. Bu ston rin chen grub [1290–1364] in Dreyfus and McClintock 2003, and Gorampa [1429–1489] in Tillemans 2003), others maintain that it has substantive philosophical import. Tsongkhapa (1357–1419), for instance, influ-

entially argues that the distinction turns on different accounts of the nature of conventional truth (Tsongkhapa 2002, Tillemans 2003).

While contemporary debates about Madhyamaka ethics all refer to the notion of conventional truth, here also there are subtle differences in what this is taken to mean. As a result, it is not always obvious whether a disagreement is substantive or an equivocation in assumed accounts. To help navigate this terrain, I will individuate three distinct philosophical positions on the nature of conventional truth and the possibilities of its rational (p. 165) and epistemic analysis that have been attributed to Madhyamaka thinkers. In particular, I will follow Tom Tillemans (2016) in distinguishing two distinct philosophical positions that have been attributed to Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka and which he respectively labels 'typical Prāsaṅgika' and 'atypical Prāsaṅgika'. I will contrast these positions to that of Svātantrika Madhyamaka, which I will interpret in the sense ascribed to Bhāvaviveka by Tsongkhapa. It is not my intention to establish that these philosophical positions are the best deservers for the labels Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika nor establish that they accurately reflect the viewpoint of any particular historical Mādhyamika thinker. My aim is simply to highlight a spectrum of philosophical positions on the nature of conventional truth and demonstrate how they respectively inform current debates about Madhyamaka ethics.

At one end of the spectrum lies what Tillemans calls the 'typical Prāsaṅgika', which, in his view, is the 'common, traditional Indian and Tibetan interpretation of Candrakīrti' (2016: 5). According to this view, it is impossible for Mādhyamikas to accept a positive thesis about ultimate reality as the result of a valid argument because this would presuppose the semantic underpinning which MMK has shown to be internally inconsistent (see Westerhoff 2009: 183, Tillemans 2016: 3, Ruegg 1981: 78). Mādhyamikas are thus methodologically constrained to using reductio arguments against their opponents' theses but without having a thesis of their own (Huntington 2003). This is not thought to foreclose *holding* views about *conventional* reality. Nevertheless, it does methodologically constrain the typical Prāsaṅgika to simply accept what 'the world acknowledges' to be the case (*lokaprasiddha*) without subjecting it to rational or epistemic analysis (Candrakīrti PPMV 18.8, in Tillemans 2011: 151, Ruegg 1981). Typical Prāsaṅgikas accept and practise according to the widely accepted standards and language of ordinary, everyday folk but do not engage in deeper philosophical questions about justificatory status or grounds.

This approach to conventional truth was heavily criticized by philosophers that have come to be classified as Svātantrika Mādhyamikas. Kamalaśīla (fl. 740–795), for instance, complained that it absurdly entailed that every belief would be true simply because its content was acknowledged to be the case, including the 'mistaken' views that the Buddha claimed to be at the root of suffering (Tillemans 2011, 2016). This approach flattens out conventional truth to mere belief without offering any intelligent means of adjudicating competing beliefs. According to Svātantrikas, for Madhyamaka to count as providing a plausible characterization of the Buddha's teachings, it needs to provide some rational way of differentiating conventional truth from falsity.

There are a variety of ways in which the philosophers who have been identified as Svā-tantrika respond to this challenge. These differences are not often considered in Madhya-maka ethics literature. When Svātantrika is referred to in this literature, it is often under-stood in terms of the position ascribed to Bhāvaviveka by Tsongkhapa (Tillemans 2003). In this chapter, I shall use the term Svātantrika to pick out this philosophical position. On Tsongkhapa's interpretation, adherents of Svātantrika respond to the above challenge by reintroducing a two-tier reductive ontology but classifying both as distinct modes of con-ventional reality. A claim about conventional reality is thus (p. 166) conventionally true if it can be established by a legitimate epistemic means (*pramāṇa*, e.g. perception or a valid inference). However, according to Tsongkhapa's interpretation, the ontological grounds of these epistemic means were considered to be a more fundamental conventional reality of entities differentiated by possession of *conventional svabhāva*. Svātantrika thus appear to overcome the problem of flattening out truth to mere belief but at the cost of reintroduc-ing the notion of *svabhāva* that was so thoroughly undermined by Nāgārjuna in MMK.

As Tillemans helpfully draws out, between the extremes of the 'typical Prāsaṅgika' and Svātantrika are a range of Mādhyamikas who seek to preserve the possibility of rationally analysing conventional truth without reintroducing the notion of *svabhāva*. Tillemans calls this group of philosophers the 'atypical Prāsaṅgikas' and identifies Tsongkhapa as their principal representative. There are several rational norms that are potentially ac-ceptable to a Prāsaṅgika for the analysis of claims about conventional reality. Here are at least two.

> **(1)** Logical or conceptual coherence and consistency are two obvious candidates giv-en that they were adhered to by Nāgārjuna to refute his opponent's theses. A claim about conventional reality might thus be falsified if, for instance, it is inconsistent or contradicts other widely accepted beliefs.
>
> **(2)** An appeal to 'widely accepted epistemic standards' might also be consistent with a commitment to *lokaprasiddha*. Candrakīrti considered at least four epistemic means to be widely accepted by the 'people of the world' for establishing the truth of ontological claims; namely, empirical observation (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), reliable testimony recorded in scriptures (*āgama*) and/or analogical similarity (*up-amāna*; Ruegg 1981). A claim about conventional reality might thus be falsified if it cannot be verified by at least one of these epistemic means.

There is much more that can be said about these different Madhyamaka approaches to the nature and analysis of conventional truth. This much should suffice, however, for us to now consider how they bear on contemporary debates about Madhyamaka ethics.

Emptiness and Systematic Ethical Distinctions

One locus of contemporary debate about the nature and possibilities of Madhyamaka ethics concerns whether a commitment to *śūnyavāda* is consistent with accepting and promoting systematic ethical distinctions between good and bad, right and wrong, virtue and vice. Madhyamaka is a school in the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition. The principal Indi-

an Madhyamaka philosophers each wrote treatises promoting Mahāyāna ethical values (some examples include Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*, Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī*, (p. 167) and Candrakīrti's *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā*). Central to these values is the bodhisattva ideal. A bodhisattva is one who, motivated by compassion (*karuṇā*) towards the suffering of others, has both committed to remaining in the realm of cyclic rebirth (*saṃsāra*) in order to relieve all suffering (i.e. they have perfected *bodhicitta*) and has cultivated those moral virtues or perfections (*pāramitā*) which enable them to enact this commitment.

Historical Indian Mādhyamika thinkers do not merely accept and promote specifically Mahāyāna values. They also accept unchallenged the Buddhist monastic rules (*Vinaya*); the typical Abhidharma lists of virtuous and non-virtuous mental factors (*caitta*); and the role of karma and its consequences as a ground for both evaluating and motivating action. It would thus seem that historical Mādhyamika thinkers did not consider *śūnyavāda* to have any significant impact on ethics or ethical reasoning. Indeed, they insisted that *śūnyavāda* does not entail moral nihilism (*ucchedavāda*). But were they correct in this view? What argument could be offered to support this conclusion? And how could Mādhyamikas justify their assumed ethical distinctions?

Mādhyamikas cannot consistently argue that certain actions, qualities, and mental factors are *ultimately* good or bad in virtue of possessing an essential property. They nevertheless could (and often did) insist that ethical distinctions are a *conventional* matter, where holding views about conventional reality is consistent with *śūnyavāda*. While this might warrant the *holding* of ethical views, in general and as such, it does not yet provide reasons for the specific ethical distinctions that Mādhyamikas endorse. What reason can a Mādhyamika offer for why certain conventional actions, qualities, and mental factors (e.g. compassion, generosity, refraining from murder) are to be considered conventionally good while certain others (e.g. selfishness, envy, murder) are to be considered conventionally bad?

According to Tillemans (2010–2011), Prāsaṅgikas can justify these distinctions by appeal to *lokaprasiddha*, treating the 'the world's fundamental moral intuitions' (364) as justificatory grounds for moral claims. This argument is offered as a response to that presented in Finnigan and Tanaka (2011). Finnigan (2015) takes the referent of this remark to be the typical Prāsaṅgika and gives reasons to think that, on a range of interpretations, this response is unsatisfactory. For instance, it is argued that if by 'the world's moral intuitions' is meant 'the set of moral intuitions shared by every intuiting individual', the fact of widespread intra-cultural and cross-cultural moral disagreement gives reason to think that there is no such agreed set (771). If, instead, one contextualized this claim to some group of intuiting individuals with some set of beliefs and values (e.g. the conventional beliefs and intuitions of Buddhists rather than those of 'the entire world'), this would problematically imply a conservatism that undermines the possibility of critiquing the views of others and revising one's own (772–773).

Perhaps the most plausible interpretation is one that grounds ethical distinctions in the widely held moral intuition that suffering is bad and to be prevented. While there might

be widespread moral disagreement about a range of values, norms, and rules, few would argue that pain and suffering are intrinsically and non-instrumentally good and to be promoted. The intuition that suffering is bad also seems to be in keeping with the Buddha's teaching of the Four Noble Truths, the first of which states the fact of suffering (p. 168) and the remaining three (diagnosing its cause, inferring the possibility of its cessation, and proposing a way to achieve this goal) presuppose its undesirability. However, this view has its limitations. The ground for the truth of these claims, according to the *lokaprasiddha* of the typical Prāsaṅgika, is their widespread acceptance. The typical Prāsaṅgika does not engage in rational or epistemic analysis of what is commonly accepted by ordinary folk. Belief is thus the condition for truth rather than truth being a standard for the assessment of belief. It follows that the Buddha's teachings would only be true to the extent that they replicate the beliefs of the majority rather than providing a corrective to widespread delusion. This not only undermines the universality and stability of the Buddha's realizations and insights but also deprives these concepts of sense. Insight, realization, and wisdom are all flattened out to mere majority opinion. This is an unsatisfactory outcome.

These arguments target the *lokaprasiddha* of the typical Prāsaṅgika. We know, however, that not all Mādhyamikas are typical Prāsaṅgikas and *lokaprasiddha* need not be interpreted as passive acquiescence to the majority view without positive analysis. A more liberal approach might admit the rational assessment of conventional claims by worldly epistemic standards. This is one of the positions we have attributed to the atypical Prāsaṅgika. From this perspective, it could be argued that the Buddha correctly diagnosed a psychological problem faced by all sentient beings; that they are prone to various forms of suffering (*duḥkha*). On the Buddha's analysis, the most prominent human form of suffering arises from a tension between:

1. A deep-seated desire (*tṛṣṇā*) for, attachment (*rāga*) to, and belief in the persistence of oneself and what one owns and loves, and
2. The fact that everything is causally conditioned (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and thus impermanent (*anitya*).

The majority of the world's citizens might not agree with this psychological analysis of the human condition but it might nevertheless be verified by accepted epistemic means, such as empirical observation, inductive and analogical reasoning, and/or reliable testimony.

A problem remains, however. These epistemic means may well warrant descriptive claims about matters of (psychological) fact. However, they do not seem adequate for ascertaining moral properties (of good, bad, right, wrong). How then does the atypical Prāsaṅgika justify their specifically evaluative distinctions beyond mere acceptance of the majority view?

One possibility is to argue that they are evaluated relative to a goal; namely, *nirvāṇa*. There are several ways of characterizing *nirvāṇa* and thus several ways of conceiving this evaluative relation. If *nirvāṇa* is understood as the bare cessation of suffering, for in-

stance, one might argue that actions, qualities, and mental factors are good or right to the extent that they are instrumental to this goal (or cause it as a consequence). If *nirvāṇa* is understood as a lived state of well-being, one might alternatively argue that actions (and so on) are good or right to the extent that they are constitutive of this way of (p. 169) living. These distinct conceptions of the goal of Buddhist practice need not be exclusive but may be nested or variously related (Finnigan 2014, 2017a).

There may also be several ways of grounding the normative force of evaluative claims relative to these distinct goals. For instance, normative force might be grounded in desire, such that if you do not desire to attain *nirvāṇa*, evaluative claims about actions or qualities that are instrumental or constitutive of this goal have no normative appeal for you. Alternatively, normative force might be grounded in an innate tendency, according to which we all, in fact, strive for *nirvāṇa* (whether the cessation of suffering or a lived state of well-being), as evident in our reactions and emotional responses. On either account, an atypical Prāsaṅgika could argue that while evaluative distinctions are themselves not evaluated using ordinary epistemic means, the desired or innately aspired for goal, relative to which they are normatively grounded, *is* a matter of empirically verifiable descriptive psychology.

This might seem to be a plausible rendering of Madhyamaka ethics from the perspective of the atypical Mādhyamika. It is consistent with both *śūnyavāda* and an epistemically constrained conception of *lokaprasiddha*. Nevertheless, it has two major implications that are potentially problematic for Buddhists, in general, as well as the Mādhyamika Śāntideva, in particular.

First, the above account would seem to rule out appeal to karmic consequences as a way of justifying evaluative claims because the operations of karma are not considered to be verifiable using ordinary epistemic means. Some philosophers argue that this is all for the best (Batchelor 2011, 2015, Tillemans 2010–2011, 2016). It has significant implications, however. Historical Mādhyamikas not only refer to karma, they frequently appeal to the notion of karmic merit (*puṇya*) as a central means by which bodhisattvas alleviate the suffering of other sentient beings (Keown 2001, Velez de Cea 2004, Adam 2005). Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and *Śikṣāsamuccaya* both emphasize the role of bodhisattva's benefiting other sentient beings by accumulating and sharing their karmic merit rather than offering direct physical or material assistance (Clayton 2006, Goodman 2009). These claims and assumptions may need to be radically revised to be consistent with the evaluative standards of the atypical Prāsaṅgika.

Second, the account offered above suggests that evaluative claims either take the form of desire-dependent hypothetical imperatives or are normatively grounded in goals that implicitly inform our behaviour. However, some read Śāntideva as arguing that a particular evaluative position (i.e. great compassion, often taken to mean altruism or impartial benevolence) is *entailed* by a proper understanding of reality. That is, if one has a right understanding of ontology, one will not only have a reason to remove the suffering of all other sentient beings but one will also be *obliged* to act in this way (Harris 2015).

Williams (1998) provides a highly influential argument that attempts to establish that this argument fails. Since Williams's analysis of Śāntideva is at the heart of much contemporary dispute about the nature of Madhyamaka ethics, it is worth considering it in some detail. As in the previous section, competing views on the nature of conventional truth will function as an organizing principle when considering the various positions advanced in current literature.

(p. 170) Does Emptiness of Self Give Good Reasons for Altruism?

In BCA 8.101–103, Śāntideva appears to argue from the fact that we are empty of self (*ātman*) to the conclusion that we should exercise impartial benevolence.[2] He writes:

> The continuum of consciousness, like a queue, and the combination of constituents, like an army, are not real. The person who experiences suffering does not exist. To whom will that suffering belong? (101)

> Without exception, no sufferings belong to anyone. They must be warded off simply because they are suffering. Why is any limitation put on this? (102)

> If one asks why suffering should be prevented, no one disputes that! If it must be prevented, then all of it must be. If not, then this goes for oneself as for anyone. (103)

One way to reconstruct these verses is as the following argument:

(1) There is no self (*ātman*); 'we' are just composites of psycho-physical elements, and composites are not real;
(2) Given (1), there is no basis for distinguishing my pain from yours; pains are ownerless;
(3) Pain is bad and to be prevented;
(4) Given (2) and (3), either all pain is to be prevented (we should act altruistically without partiality) or no pain is to be prevented (we should be apathetic without partiality);
(5) All pain is to be prevented (we should act altruistically without partiality).

According to Williams, this argument turns on removing the ontological grounds of egoism. Since there is no self, there are no grounds for distinguishing my suffering from yours. It follows that egoistic self-interest in preventing one's own suffering is irrational and thus, for reasons of rational consistency, one should be impartially benevolent. Williams contends, however, that there are two possible ways of interpreting the first premise of this argument, both of which fail to secure this conclusion:

> **1(a)** Śāntideva denies the ultimate reality of a self (*ātman*, understood as a persistent, unchanging, essence of persons) but allows that persons are conventionally real.

According to Williams, if *this* is what Śāntideva meant then his argument fails because it does not remove the grounds for egoistic self-interest. One can still privilege the interests of a conventional self.

(p. 171)

> **1(b)** Śāntideva denies both the ultimate and conventional reality of selves. All that exist are psycho-physical elements in causal relations.

This interpretation removes all possible ontological grounds for egoistic self-interest, and is, in Williams's view, the only way Śāntideva's argument will work. However, as Williams argues, this interpretation has dire consequences for ordinary ethical transactions. By removing the distinction between 'self' and 'other', it makes nonsense of a bodhisattva's commitment to sacrifice their 'own' karmic merit for the sake of 'others'. Since there are no 'others' there is no object of a bodhisattva's compassion or altruistic concern. By removing the notion of an agent, there can also be no actions of a bodhisattva that could be evaluated and accrue merit—and thus no act of 'committing' oneself to removing the suffering of others. Williams not only thinks this view has dire ethical implications, he also thinks it presupposes mistaken views on the metaphysics of personality. He insists, for instance, that the reductive analysis of persons as collectives of elements *presupposes* the concept of a person (i.e. parts are identified in relation to the whole rather than the whole derived from an otherwise random collection of parts). Williams concludes that Śāntideva faces a dilemma, neither horn of which is acceptable. As a result, Śāntideva not only fails to provide a rational basis for altruism but, according to Williams, if you follow his argument to its logical conclusion, it destroys the bodhisattva path.

Most contemporary responses to Williams's argument deny that Śāntideva intended interpretation 1(b). These responses typically emerge from reflections on a puzzle concerning premise (1). This premise is most straightforwardly read as a statement of ultimate truth from the perspective of Abhidharma ontology, according to which only causally related psycho-physical elements are real and persons are unreal. But Śāntideva is a Mādhyamika. Why would a Mādhyamika argue from an Ābhidharmika ontological position? Some offer a methodological explanation of this apparent fact (Siderits 2000, 2015). Others deny that this is the best way to read premise (1), offering instead an alternative interpretation that is more in keeping with Madhyamaka. I will discuss three alternative interpretations

below. Whichever way one goes, it would seem that neither an Ābhidharmika nor a Mādhyamika would accept 1(b). Not only do Mādhyamikas accept the conventional reality of persons, so too do Ābhidharmikas. It has also been noted that Śāntideva writes elsewhere as if there are conventional selves (Clayton 2001, 2006, Harris 2015). Moreover, some argue that since the implications of 1(b) are so disastrous for ethics, it would be more charitable *not* to attribute this interpretation to Śāntideva (Harris 2015).

While rejecting interpretation 1(b) might avoid one horn of Williams's dilemma, it does not thereby successfully navigate the other. Interpreting premise (1) in terms of 1(a) is also problematic, for several reasons.

First, how are we to understand premise (2) and its entailment from 1(a)? As above, these premises seem to be most straightforwardly read as claims about ultimate reality from an Abhidharma perspective. On this view, pain (a kind of *vedanā*) is a proper constituent of ultimate reality, an element of the psycho-physical aggregate to which (p. 172) persons are reducible. Since persons, subjects, and agents are not ultimately real, pain does not ultimately occur in or for anyone; it just occurs. It is not obvious that a Mādhyamika can accept this premise. Certainly not if construed as a statement about ultimate reality since, as we know, Mādhyamikas typically deny that anything ultimately exists (in the sense given to this notion by Ābhidharmikas). It might be possible for a Svātantrika Mādhyamika to rationally accept these premises if construed as claims about (a judiciously revised) conventional reality. From the perspective of the typical Prāsaṅgika, however, persons and instances of pain have the same ontological standing; namely, as constituents of the conventional reality as accepted by most ordinary people (*lokaprasiddha*). From this perspective, (2) is false. Common sense distinguishes between the pains of distinct subjects.

What about the atypical Prāsaṅgika? The answer to this question might depend on how we understand the idea of 'ownerless pain'. There seem to be at least two ways to understand this claim. First, as the claim that pains are not mental events that are possessed by persons (where this assumes a possession-relation between two entities; a pain event and a person). Second, as a claim that pains just occur without being felt or experienced by a subject. Williams takes the latter to be the sense required by Śāntideva's argument and insists that it does not make sense. For Williams, conscious mental states necessarily involve an element of subjectivity; phenomenal content always appears to or for a subject. Clayton (2001) responds that to reject the idea of ownerless pains is to 'effectively dismiss all of Buddhism: the heart of Buddhist insight is the mystery of experience without subject' (86). This is not necessarily true. Prominent Yogācāra and Pramāṇavāda thinkers maintained that ordinary conscious experiences necessarily involve both phenomenal content and the subjective experiencing thereof.[3] A version of this idea is accepted and defended by several prominent Yogācāra Svātantrika Mādhyamikas (e.g. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla), although it does not seem in keeping with the form of Svātantrika that we have been discussing in this chapter. To the extent that it reflects a common intuition about the nature of consciousness, it might nevertheless be consistent with the *lokaprasiddha* of typical Prāsaṅgikas. The case of the atypical Prāsaṅgika is more challenging. A prominent analysis of this thesis (subjectivity analysed as *svasaṃvedana*)

was rejected by Tsongkhapa, although there is reason to think that his arguments against this view would not vindicate the notion of ownerless pain at the level of conventional truth (Garfield 2006, Williams 2013). For these reasons, it would thus seem that premise (2) is problematic from a range of Madhyamaka perspectives.

We might also query the status of premise (3), the claim that pain is bad and to be prevented. If (3) is understood as a statement of ultimate reality, then it is unacceptable to a Mādhyamika. Could it be accepted as a conventional truth? To the extent that it is a common moral intuition that is accepted by most ordinary people, it is acceptable to (p. 173) the typical Prāsaṅgika. Indeed, this might be one way to read Śāntideva's qualification that 'no one disputes that!' (BCA 8.103). Could it be accepted by the atypical Prāsaṅgika? It might seem that their response would be much the same as the typical Prāsaṅgika. However, this might depend on whether the atypical Prāsaṅgika thinks that conventional claims must be verified to be held as true or merely unfalsified by rational and epistemic analysis. Perhaps the rational norm of consistency might verify the truth of (3) (as more consistent with other widely accepted moral intuitions than its denial) but it is not clear that it can be verified by epistemic norms, which are concerned with matters of descriptive fact rather than normative evaluation. If, however, the position is that conventional claims need merely be *unfalsified* by these epistemic means, then (3) might be reasonably held as conventionally true.

The case of Svātantrika is interesting. We have been presenting it as rationally analysing conventional claims in terms that assume a reductive ontology (albeit one that holds within the scope of conventional reality). In the Abhidharma context, reductive analysis eliminates social, linguistic, and conceptual construction to expose a mind-independent reality. Interestingly, this reduction is not thought to eliminate evaluative considerations. Abhidharma thinkers assumed that the mental elements that constitute ultimate reality are fundamentally valenced (positive, negative, or neutral). Pain is thus ultimately bad, not because we judge pain to be bad but because its ultimate valence is negative, a fact that is bodily registered and evident in our aversive reactions. This is a fascinating idea but highly controversial. It is also not clear that it is equivalent to the claim that pain is bad and to be removed. Svātantrikas, unlike Ābdhidharmikas, can avoid some of these problems, however, given that they clearly maintain that their reduction occurs in the sphere of the conventional. There is thus no question, for them, of reducing away all social, linguistic, conceptual construction from the reduced level of conventional reality.

While premise (3) seems to be acceptable to all Mādhyamikas, we might still question the entailment from (4) to the conclusion. Premise (4) is a disjunction between removing all pain and removing none. The conclusion affirms one of these disjuncts. What reason is there for this affirmation? Why should a proper understanding of the nature of persons lead us to extend our (otherwise egoistic) concern to the removal of all pain rather than, for instance, ceasing to care at all about its occurrence (Harris 2011)? It could be argued that premise (3) supplies the necessary reason; it is because pain is bad and to be re-

moved which, as we have already suggested, is acceptable as a conventional truth by all Mādhyamikas.

Even if we grant the entailment between (4) and the conclusion, Williams argues that the overall argument has a structural flaw; namely, it attempts to infer certain prescriptive claims about how we 'ought' to behave from certain descriptive facts about what 'is' the case. The attempt to derive an ought-from-is is a fallacy that was famously diagnosed by Hume. It might seem, however, that premise (3) inserts the requisite normative element to avoid this charge. That is, the normative claim that pain is bad and to be removed seems to be doing the normative work with respect to the conclusion and not the descriptive claim about the emptiness of persons.

(p. 174) Finally, even if the 'is–ought' issue can be resolved, the argument still faces Williams's fundamental concern with 1(a); namely, if we opt for this interpretation, how does it avoid reinstating self-interested egoism and thereby undermining Śāntideva's argument?

While Mādhyamikas may be able to accept some of the premises in the argument reconstructed from BCA 8.101–103, it would thus seem that they cannot accept them all. Does this mean that Williams is right and Śāntideva's argument fails? Not necessarily. We might still query whether the idea contained in these verses is best reconstructed as an argument consisting of these premises or even whether there is a better argument to be found in Śāntideva's thought. We might also query whether his verses are best understood as presenting arguments at all. This chapter shall conclude by considering three alternative reconstructions of Śāntideva's thought that have been advanced in recent literature and shall assess whether they offer a more plausible account of the relationships between a Madhyamaka understanding of emptiness, conventional truth, compassion, and impartial benevolence.

The 'We Are All One' Conventional Self Argument

The first alternative draws on additional verses contained in BCA 8 to justify modifying Williams's reconstructed argument in a way that would consistently allow a moderate sense of egoistic self-interest. According to this alternative, the sense of conventional persons that is reinstated in 1(a) is not the unrevised, common-sense notion that 'we' are all distinct persons. Rather, it is a revised, 'enlightened' view that 'we' are just aspects of one, whole, unified, integrated conventional self. A version of this idea is defended by Wetleson 2002 (see Priest 2015 for a different argument to a similar conclusion). Wetleson derives evidence for this revised conventional self from an 'organismic analogy' (2002: 64) he finds in the following verses:

> If you think that it is for the person who has pain to guard against it, a pain in the foot is not of the hand, so why is the one protected by the other? (BCA 8.99)

> In the same way that the hands and other limbs are loved because they form part of the body, why are embodied creatures not likewise loved because they form part of the universe? (BCA 8.114)

According to Wetleson, this organismic analogy extends to relations between persons, which are thereby to be understood as aspects of a more comprehensive organism—a unified but multi-aspected conventional self. The clear advantage of this suggestion is that it is consistent with egoistic self-interest and thus avoids Williams's main challenge to Śāntideva. Since we are all part of the same self, interest in one's own welfare includes an interest in that of others *as part of* one's own welfare (2002: 52). The conclusion of this (p. 175) argument is no longer that we should be *impartially* benevolent but, rather, we should be *partially* benevolent, where the revised scope of this partiality encompasses all sentient beings.

Despite overcoming Williams's major objection to Śāntideva's argument, this account has several problems from the perspective of Madhyamaka. First, it implies a radical revision to Williams's premise (2). It is no longer the case that all pains are similar in being ownerless but, rather, all pains are similar in being *mine* (Williams 1998). To say that a pain is mine is typically taken to mean that it is experienced by me. However, it is highly counterintuitive to say that I experience *all* pain. Not only is it widely assumed that we do not and cannot literally experience the pain that is experienced by another, this (conventional) fact informs our attitudes, reactions, and conduct. This revision to premise (2) is clearly unacceptable to the typical Prāsaṅgika, who only agrees with what is widely accepted by the world.

It would also seem that, for this very same reason, the typical Prāsaṅgika would also reject Wetleson's revised notion of the 'one' conventional self. It is much more widely believed that persons are separate and distinct than that they are all aspects of a single, integrated being. It is also not clear that this idea is acceptable to Svātantrika, who grounds conventional claims in a reduced conventional ontology, which is methodologically antithetical to increased unification.

What about atypical Prāsaṅgikas? Could they accept the conventional reality of a unified self? The answer will depend on the assumed criteria for conventional existence. According to Wetleson, conventional claims are determined on the basis of pragmatic considerations which are validated by consensus (2002: 43) and linguistic use (48). The criterion for conventional reality thus seems to be a matter of collectively agreed social construction. There are two problems with this view, however. For the 'one' self to count as conventionally real, according to this criterion, it must either be a construction about which there is collective agreement (*lokaprasiddha* in the sense accepted by the typical Prāsaṅgika) or one about which there *should be* consensus. We have already argued that it does not satisfy the former. This criterion also does not seem robust enough to satisfy the atypical Prāsaṅgika who, as we have characterized the view, takes widely accepted epistemic norms as standards for truth. Further argument is needed to show that the no-

tion of a single, integrated self can satisfy such standards as empirical observation and inductive inference and thus should be accepted.

The 'No Relevant Difference' or 'Rationality' Argument

A second alternative to Williams's reconstruction of the argument contained in BCA 8.101–103 draws on verses 90–98 to reconstruct a more minimal and seemingly more plausible argument from Śāntideva's thought. Versions of this argument can be found (p. 176) in Williams (1998: ch. 2), Pettit (1999), Clayton (2001), Wetleson (2002), and Garfield, Jenkins, and Priest (2015). The argument turns on the idea that there is no relevant difference between you and me to justify prioritizing the prevention of my pain over yours. We might reconstruct this argument as follows:

> **(1)** Egoistic self-interest assumes that there is something relevantly distinctive about oneself that justifies prioritizing one's own interest over that of others;
> **(2)** (1) is false. There is nothing relevantly distinctive about oneself that justifies prioritizing one's own interest over that of others;
> **(3)** Pain is bad and to be prevented;
> **(4)** Given (2) and (3), there is no good reason to privilege preventing my pain over yours;
> **(C)** (Given 4), self-interest is irrational and so, for reasons of rational consistency, one should prevent pain without partiality.

As Clayton (2001) points out, this has the same structure as anti-discrimination arguments. Since I am not special in any morally relevant sense, my suffering should not count as more important than yours and so I should treat your suffering as just as important as mine. An advantage of this argument is that it does not presuppose the idea of ownerless pains, which we have argued is questionable from a Madhyamaka perspective. It also tackles Williams's problem of egoism head on and appears to shift the burden of proof onto the egoist rather than providing an independent proof for impartial benevolence (Pettit 2000, Garfield, Jenkins, and Priest 2015). Its plausibility, however, hangs on the truth of (2). What reasons are there to accept this premise and do they require taking a perspective on conventional reality that is unacceptable to Madhyamaka?

In BCA 8.94–98, Śāntideva seems to offer two reasons for thinking that (conventional) persons are relevantly similar to justify equal consideration with respect to the prevention of pain. The first reason is contained in BCA verses 94–96:

> I should dispel the suffering of others because it is suffering like my own suffering. I should help others too because of their nature as beings, which is like my own being. (BCA 8.94)
>
> When happiness is liked by me and others equally, what is so special about me that I strive after happiness only for myself? (BCA 8.95)

> When fear and suffering are disliked by me and others equally, what is so special about me that I protect myself and not the other? (BCA 8.96)

The intended answer to these rhetorical questions is: 'Nothing'. There is nothing special about me to warrant privileging the prevention of my pain over yours. Why? Because we are relevantly similar in our nature as sentient beings who desire happiness and seek to avoid suffering. Whether or not we think this is a sufficient reason for the conclusion, it would seem to be a reason that all Mādhyamikas could accept if construed as a conventional truth that is either accepted on the basis of rational reflection, epistemic analysis, (p. 177) or a common intuition that is widely accepted by most ordinary people. Moreover, it would seem to be a reason all Mādhyamikas would *want* to accept given that it is a central presupposition of the Buddha's Four Noble Truths and all Mādhyamikas seek to be consistent with the Buddha's teachings.

This is not the only reason offered by Śāntideva, however. The following verse offers a slightly different one: 'If I give them no protection because their suffering does not afflict me, why do I protect my body against the future suffering when it does not afflict me?' (BCA 8.97). Here, Śāntideva seems to be pointing out that egoistic self-interest is future oriented. The pain we seek to prevent is not pain we are currently experiencing; it is pain that will occur in the future. However, Śāntideva appears to suggest that a future self is similar to contemporary others in (having the property of) being non-identical to our present self. And he infers from this fact that there is thus no good reason to privilege preventing pain to a future self over that of a contemporary other since in neither case is the pain experienced by me. Moreover, he insists that it is no good saying 'but the future self will be *me*' because this, he claims, is a 'false construction' (BCA 8.98).

It is not obvious that Mādhyamikas can accept this second reason. First, it seems to be most straightforwardly read as a claim about ultimate reality from an Abhidharma perspective. According to Abhidharma, 'we' are just continua of psycho-physical elements with momentarily fleeting existence. It follows that none of the ultimate constituents of (what is conventionally called) 'me' now will be the same as the ultimate constituents of (what is conventionally called) 'me' at any future time and so, quite literally, the term 'me' does not pick out the same person from one moment to the next. Given this ontology, one can straightforwardly infer analogical similarity in 'non-identity' between (a) current-me and future-me to (b) current-me and current-you.

As we know, Mādhyamikas deny that there is an ultimate reality, so construed, and thus cannot accept this reason as a statement of ultimate truth. If construed as a rationally revised claim about conventional reality, it *might* be acceptable to a Svātantrika Mādhyamika. It would be inconsistent with the *lokaprasiddha* of the typical Prāsaṅgika, however. While most people may not believe that they have a soul or essence (*ātman*) that exists permanently and unchanging through time and across lives, it is ordinarily assumed that the embodied being that is ourselves now will be (despite inevitable changes) continuous in several important respects (e.g. memory, body) with our embodied being in the future in a way that it is not continuous with the embodied being of others.

It is also not clear that this second reason is consistent with the *lokaprasiddha* of the atypical Prāsaṅgika, given that it has implications that are not only in tension with norms of rationality but might also undermine our rational capacities. A belief in a (conventionally) enduring self not only informs much of our ordinary conduct (e.g. we brush our own teeth, rather than the teeth of others, to prevent the decay that we would otherwise experience in future; Williams 1998), but to suppose otherwise would seem to undermine our capacity to plan as forms of instrumental reasoning that concern ourselves (Wetleson 2002).

(p. 178) Moreover, as Harris (2015) points out, just as we have moral intuitions to take care of others, we also have moral intuitions that admit a moderate amount of egoism. A certain amount of self-care is often considered to be morally praiseworthy. We commend those who, for instance, quit smoking to prevent cancer, exercise to prevent obesity-related illnesses, refrain from drinking over the legal limit before driving. While these actions might benefit both the agent in the future as well as others, we typically would not blame or criticize the agent for performing these preventative actions if done purely for the sake of their own future well-being. It would thus seem that, with respect to some moral intuitions, the fact that the 'future self will be me' *does* count as a good reason for performing certain forms of action. Harris takes this as grounds for shifting the burden of proof back to Śāntideva. While emphasizing the similarity of (conventional) persons might support certain moral intuitions, emphasizing their differences supports others. A new argument is needed to show why the latter are irrational and the former not.

A final issue with this argument is that the textual support for this reconstruction is drawn from verses other than 101–103. It thus seems to avoid the problems Williams raises for verses 101–103 by reconstructing a different argument for impartial benevolence from a different set of verses that are concerned with the same issue. While this alternative argument is perhaps more plausible (particularly if one focuses only on the first reason offered to justify (2), as do Garfield, Jenkins, and Priest 2015), this is in part due to the fact that it omits the problematic elements that Williams finds so objectionable in 101–103.

A Meditational Technique Aimed at Psychological Transformation

The third alternative this chapter will consider (but by no means the only remaining possibility) denies that BCA 8.101–103 provides an argument aimed at proving that we should be impartially beneficent. Rather, according to this alternative, these verses are best read as raising considerations that, in the context of meditation, will help undermine the attachment to self, or self-grasping, that underpins many of our negative emotions. The objective of these verses is thus not to establish the rationality of impartial beneficence but, rather, to assist in actually generating a compassionate concern for others when incorporated into meditative practice.

A version of this suggestion was initially proposed by Pettit (1999), who identifies prominent Tibetan Gelug Madhyamaka thinkers, Tsongkhapa in particular, as differentiating two problematic senses of 'self' that need to be eliminated. The first is *ātman*, the philosophical view that there is an enduring substance, wholly present from moment to moment, that exists separate from and as the owner of events in conscious awareness. The second, however, is an innate and largely unconscious sense of self-grasping that Gelugpas think underlie our negative emotions and can be exposed when subjects are (p. 179) placed in situations of emotional duress. Pettit calls this sense of self-grasping an 'innate misconception of self' (1999: 132) or an 'emotionally conflicted self' (132). From this perspective, ordinary, conventional life is to be understood as a mixture of an ordinary, innocent sense of persons (useful for practical and ethical transactions) and a problematic misconceived sense of self that informs our negative emotions.

If we grant this distinction, Śāntideva's thought might then be read as merely providing suggestions that, in the context of meditative practice, help undermine the 'innate misconceived self' and contribute to positive changes in one's moral psychology. For instance, if one recognizes a habitual selfish tendency in oneself (or its emergence in a particular instance), reflecting on the idea that we are empty of selves might help undermine the self-grasping that is constitutive of this emotional state and thereby help transform it to another psychological state, such as unselfishness or compassionate concern for others. According to Westerhoff (2015), merely reflecting on (or believing the truth of) this idea is insufficient for bringing about this transformation. What is required is a 'meditational realization' of the truth of this claim. This is claimed to result not in a belief about what one *should* do but, rather, a change in what one *actually* does, given an understanding of emotions as behavioural tendencies that habitually implicate how we react. Such transformation is also thought to change how one experiences the world given the assumption that emotions implicate our phenomenology.

There are several advantages of this alternative reading of Śāntideva's verses. First, it avoids Williams's charge that Śāntideva fallaciously infers a normative conclusion from descriptive facts. On this account, one psychological state (i.e. realizing the truth of a claim) helps produce another psychological state with behavioural implications, both of which are matters of descriptive fact (Harris 2011, Westerhoff 2015). Second, it avoids Williams's charge that the argument fails to prove its conclusion because it fails to remove the grounds of egoism. This is because it is no longer conceived as an argument aimed at proving a conclusion. Third, this way of understanding 101–103 avoids some of the problems that arise for the idea of 'ownerless pains' and the Abhidharma-style reduction it implies because it does not require Mādhyamikas to *accept* these ideas. Rather, it could be argued that Mādhyamikas merely *utilize* these ideas as a matter of skilful means (*upāya*) aimed at psychological transformation rather than endorsing them as positive theses. Fourth, this reading might explain why these verses are contained in a chapter titled 'The Perfection of Meditative Absorption'. Finally, this reading suggests broader Buddhist themes concerning the role of self-conception and self-grasping in moral psychology, thereby promising to complement a more extensive body of Buddhist literature.

As with the previous alternatives, this reading of BCA 8.101–103 is not unproblematic. One issue concerns whether it can be considered an accurate reconstruction of the idea contained in Śāntideva's verses. As pointed out by Williams (1999), Pettit explicitly attributes this distinction between (a) a belief in a philosophical *ātman* and (b) an innate sense of self implicated by our negative emotions to later Tibetan Gelug Mādhyamikas writing between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. It is not obvious (p. 180) that the seventh-century Śāntideva himself had this distinction in mind when writing these verses.

This reconstruction also seems to imply a more sophisticated analysis of emotions than that presupposed by Śāntideva's verses. In 101–103, pain seems to be conceived as a simple and unstructured mental occurrence. This analysis of psychological transformation, however, requires an analysis of emotions as behavioural dispositions that are constituted by certain intentional attitudes and beliefs. There thus seems to be a mismatch in presuppositions about the nature of mental states.

One might also query whether there is a genuine distinction to be drawn between (a) and (b). For instance, (b) is sometimes characterized as a latent tendency to reify the self, a grasping at permanence and self-essence. However, this is also how the notion of *ātman* is sometimes conceived. There might thus seem to be no substantive difference between the two. If this is right, one might use this fact to resist the previous objection. That is, one could argue that both are implicated by the denial of self, and thus one does not need the later Tibetan distinction to draw the latter sense out of Śāntideva's thought.

One might nevertheless wonder whether the denial of self in the sense of both (a) and (b) could allow for an innocent and acceptable notion of conventional self. As reconstructed by Pettit, (b) is a sense of self constitutive of negative emotions. Williams (1999) expresses doubt that one could differentiate this from a sense of self implicated by positive emotions or even one that is emotionally neutral but necessary for ordinary, practical transactions (149). If there is no clear difference, one might then worry whether eliminating (b) would result in eliminating *all* conventional notions of self (including the notions of subject, agent, and the distinction between self and other). One way to avoid this implication might be to argue that the difference between (b) and an innocent, acceptable notion of conventional self lies not in a distinct *sense* of conventional self but in a distinct attitude towards it (i.e. one of attachment or grasping). Thus, in removing (a) one removes (b) understood as the attitude of *attachment* to or grasping at self rather than the conventional notion of there *being* a self. Alternatively, it could be argued that since (b) is a form of (a), it has properties that are inconsistent with the broader set of our conventional beliefs unlike an innocent, acceptable notion of conventional self as subject and agent (Westerhoff 2015). It would thus be open to an atypical Mādhyamika to reject conventional conceptions of self that are inconsistent with rational norms of consistency and coherence but retain those that are consistent.

Finally, it would seem that much more would need to be said to explain how exactly a 'meditational realization' that we are empty of selves functions to transform various psychological attitudes and behaviour. The idea is intriguing; there does seem to be a sub-

stantive difference between believing something and *understanding* it and *realizing* its truth. However, further explanation is needed for how these distinct notions are implicated by various forms of psychological attitudes and behavioural response. This might not be a problem if the claim is simply that an event of realization merely provides meditative *assistance* for the removal of selfishness and production of compassion. The need for explanation becomes more pressing, however, if the claim is that it is a sufficient cause of this transformation.

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Notes:

(1) Many thanks to Sara McClintock, Tom Tillemans, and the editors of this collection for helpful comments on a previous draft of this chapter.

(2) English translations of this text can be found in Batchelor (1998), Crosby and Skilton (1996), Wallace and Wallace (1997), Padmakara Translation Group (2006). Citations come from Crosby and Skilton.

(3) This idea is captured in the notion of ordinary experiences having 'subject–object duality'. See Vasubandhu in TSN, Dignāga in PS, and Dharmakīrti in PV and PVin. For a brief overview of these ideas and references to relevant secondary literature, see Finnigan (2017b).

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